As the war between the United States, Israel, and Iran is now in its third week its 14th day, questions are mounting about whether Washington underestimated Tehran’s resilience and the wider regional consequences of the conflict.
In an exclusive conversation with Firstpost, geopolitical expert Henri J. Barkey, who is an adjunct senior fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and Bernard L and Bertha F Cohen Chair in International Relations at Lehigh University, argues that the conflict may have been built on a major miscalculation.
Barkey says the Trump administration likely assumed the Iranian regime would collapse quickly after initial strikes. Instead, the war has entered an uncertain phase where even a ceasefire may not stop the conflict or violence, given Iran’s network of allied groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis.
He also warns that instability inside Iran — from Kurdish regions to Balochistan — could reshape the country’s internal politics in the aftermath of the war, while disruptions in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz threaten to drag entire West Asia deeper into crisis.
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But Iranian officials say there can be no ceasefire unless the United States guarantees that there will be no further aggression. At this stage, how do you see the war evolving, and where do you think it is headed?
Look, this subject is a difficult question because I don’t think Trump had a clear plan or a long-term vision for how this conflict would unfold. He probably assumed that, after the first few days, the Iranian regime would collapse and the war would end quickly. That appears to have been a miscalculation.
For that reason, it is difficult to predict how the situation will end. One possible scenario is that the United States and Israel eventually say they have achieved their objectives and decide to stop the campaign unilaterally. That may be what happens next.
However, even if the United States and Israel stop their operations, it does not necessarily mean Iran will stop its attacks. Iran could continue the fight through occasional missile strikes or other actions. In that case, the United States and Israel would likely retaliate, potentially leading to another cycle of escalation.
At the moment, it is very difficult to see a clear endgame. It is possible that the United States and Israel announce a unilateral ceasefire, and Iran also decides to stop fighting. Much will depend on mediation efforts by other countries.
Today we also saw comments from the IRGC suggesting that China, Russia, and other countries are trying to mediate a ceasefire between the United States, Iran, and Israel. Iranian officials say they could consider a ceasefire but want assurances from Washington that there will be no further aggression. If the United States provides such assurances, could the situation in West Asia stabilise?
The challenge is that even if the United States and Israel announce a ceasefire and Iran agrees, Iran is networked with allied groups—Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias. If missiles are launched from Yemen toward Israel or American ships, or if attacks occur through these groups, the ceasefire could quickly collapse.
There is also the possibility of disruptions to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz carried out by actors claiming to act in Iran’s name rather than by Iran directly. That would make monitoring and enforcing a ceasefire extremely difficult.
Therefore, even if we declare a ceasefire, we face the risk of other actors violating it and reigniting the conflict. The reality is that this crisis has been building for decades through the activities of Iran’s allied groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. Iran must also stop these groups’ attacks if it agrees to a ceasefire. Whether that is possible remains uncertain.The main players in the war are Israel, the United States, and Iran. However, Iran’s attacks have targeted neighboring countries such as Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain. Does this condition mean the entire region risks destabilisation unless all stakeholders move toward a ceasefire?
Let’s separate the issues. When you discuss the region, you are referring to the Persian Gulf countries — Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. Iran has directly targeted these countries, not Hezbollah or Shia militias in Iraq.
The broader issue involves groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, various Shia militias, and the Houthis attacking Israel or American interests. That is where the main escalation risk lies. These groups are unlikely to target the Gulf states directly.
The real concern is attacks against the United States or Israel. Such attacks are far more likely to trigger strong retaliation, which could escalate the conflict and potentially expand it into a wider regional confrontation.
Some reports even indicate that Trump has been in talks with Kurdish groups in Iran about opening another front against Tehran, potentially involving military support and strategic cooperation that could reshape regional dynamics. Given your expertise on this issue, how do you see the situation developing?
Look, I think a tremendous deal has been made of a few comments by Trump that were not well thought through. Iranian Kurds have been politically active for many years. Among the various Iranian Kurdish groups, two — KPI and PJAK — have had fighters operating inside Iran.
On February 22, five Iranian Kurdish groups came together politically and announced they would start coordinating their efforts. Historically, they often worked at cross-purposes and realized that this fragmentation weakened their cause.
Trump suggested that Kurdish forces might join the war against the Iranian government and hinted at the possibility of training and support. There were even reports about potential training programs for Kurdish fighters. But the reality is that there are not enough Kurdish fighters to significantly change the military balance. Training and building an effective force takes a long time. You must recruit people, vet them carefully to ensure they are not Iranian intelligence agents, and build an organized structure. That process can take months or even years.
In a sense, Trump’s comments may have inadvertently placed the Kurds in a difficult position.
Another factor is that Israeli strikes targeted several military installations in Kurdish regions, including facilities linked to the IRGC and Basij. One interpretation is that these attacks were intended to reduce military pressure in Kurdish areas, potentially giving Kurdish groups more room to maneuver. If there were to be broader unrest in Iran after the conflict, fewer military installations in those regions could create space for local actors to organize.
However, this is more of a post-conflict scenario. In the short term, Iranian Kurdish groups are unlikely to significantly affect the course of the current conflict.
And also, since you mentioned this, do you believe Iran’s Kurdish regions could become politically volatile if the war further weakens the central government?
Yes, let me put it this way. The Iranian regime and its security forces have been hit quite badly across the country. Re-establishing control everywhere will be difficult. There could be instability not only in Kurdistan but also in places like Balochistan. Kurdish regions are not the only areas with potential unrest.
It is possible that Kurdish areas may become more active politically. Historically, Iranian Kurds have been relatively quiet.
You don’t hear much about them.
In contrast, Kurds in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq have gained far greater visibility and influence and have been widely discussed internationally. Now, for the first time, the Iranian Kurds may begin to attract more global attention, which could translate into some degree of political support.
At the same time, the Iranian regime will do everything in its power to suppress Kurdish movements. It will not be easy for them. The Kurdish regions have long had a heavy security presence, and economically they remain underdeveloped compared with other parts of Iran.
What we may be witnessing could be the beginning of a long process, similar to what unfolded in Iraq and Syria.
Many analysts argue that this was an ill-planned war from Donald Trump’s side and that none of the major objectives have been achieved. There has been no regime change, and now Mojtaba Khamenei — considered more hardline than his father — has emerged as a key figure. Do you agree with the argument that the US was poorly prepared for this war and is now losing it, or has Iran suffered significant collateral damage?
Look, the damage to Iran is considerable. This is not the kind of bombing Iran has faced before. The destruction has been very serious, and it will take the country a long time to recover and rebuild. Essentially, what the Americans and Israelis have done is push back Iranian progress on several fronts, possibly for a decade or more.
Think about it this way: when critical infrastructure such as oil depots and electricity-generation facilities are destroyed, reconstruction becomes the priority after a ceasefire. When rebuilding begins, the government will have to focus on restoring basic infrastructure rather than advancing its nuclear program. In that sense, the attacks have forced Iran into a difficult choice about what to prioritize.
If a new leader were to say that rebuilding the nuclear program should come first, the Iranian public might question why basic needs — electricity, fuel, and infrastructure—are not being addressed instead.
There is no doubt that Trump did not fully think through the war because he did not appear to have a clear long-term strategy. At the same time, it would be incorrect to say that none of his objectives were achieved. Through sheer destruction, some goals have been accomplished. The original objective may have been regime change, but that was always unrealistic.
Yes, Khamenei’s son is considered more hardline and may now be influential. But conflicts of this scale often trigger deeper political and social changes. Once the fighting stops, the Iranian regime may face difficult questions from its own population about why the country had to endure such destruction.
It is also important to remember that this conflict did not emerge overnight. For decades, the Iranian regime has targeted Western and Israeli interests. In 1994, for example, a Jewish centre in Argentina was bombed, killing 85 people. From West Asia to Latin America, there have been numerous attacks linked to Iranian networks that rarely resulted in direct consequences for Tehran.
Today, in many ways, Iran is paying a price for those long-standing tensions. From the perspective of Israelis or Americans, there has always been a persistent security concern that groups such as Hezbollah or Hamas — supported by Iran — could launch attacks.
Consider the events of October 7, when Hamas attacked Israel. The following day, Hezbollah also opened a front against Israel, forcing the evacuation of large parts of northern Israel. Hezbollah’s actions were widely believed to be coordinated with Iranian interests. Similarly, the Houthis launched missiles with Iranian backing.
Iran has often relied on these allied groups to carry out operations while maintaining plausible deniability. However, many governments believe Tehran has been directing the broader strategy. In that sense, this war has been building for a long time, and what we are witnessing now is part of that accumulated conflict.
Some analysts say the US did not anticipate this level of retaliation or resistance from Iran. Do you agree with that assessment that Iran has mounted a strong retaliation against the United States and Israel?
No, I don’t.
Yes, Iran fired a large number of missiles, and a few managed to evade countermeasures and hit targets. However, compared to the 12-day war in June, the damage was significantly less. Very few of those missiles caused serious destruction. So I don’t think the retaliation was particularly powerful.
In fact, the reason Iran targeted places like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar is that it could not successfully hit American or Israeli targets as planned. It is much easier to strike targets in nearby Gulf countries than to hit American ships or Israel itself.
So, overall, I don’t think the Iranian retaliation was very successful.
Some observers argue this reflects a “divide and rule” strategy in which Gulf states are drawn into the war while the United States exports arms and defense equipment. How do you see this situation, where the US is considered encouraging Persian Gulf countries to join the war alongside the United States and Israel against Iran?
Look, I would not take everything that Lindsey Graham or even Trump says too seriously. They often make statements that are not necessarily meant as serious policy positions. Everyone knows that the Saudis are unlikely to join this war. They are the ones who have to live next to Iran, not the United States.
I don’t think those statements should be overinterpreted. There is a lot of rhetoric. Even Trump changes his position frequently, sometimes within hours, so it is difficult to treat every statement as a clear policy signal.
Some analysts argue that US military bases across the Persian Gulf have become a liability for host countries, making them potential targets in regional conflicts. One politician even remarked that instead of US bases protecting Gulf countries, Gulf countries are protecting the US bases. How do you see this situation evolving?
I expected such comments. In some ways, they are understandable because these countries are now being targeted after the United States decided to attack Iran.
But consider the other possibility. If a more radical Iranian regime consolidates power in Iran, those countries may still want American bases there, because the United States remains the only power capable of deterring Iran.
So there are two sides to the argument. Yes, American bases can create risks for host countries. But they can also provide protection. If Iran emerges from this conflict with a revanchist leadership seeking to exact a price, these countries may feel an even stronger need for American security guarantees.
In that sense, one could argue that by attacking Iran, the United States has ensured that its military presence in the region will remain necessary.
For the final question, what is your comment on the United States’ diplomatic policy of embracing predatory hegemony? Many argue that such a policy could eventually backfire, leading to increased anti-American sentiment and destabilization in the region. What is predatory hegemony?
Trump’s policies will not become permanent American policy. In three years, when a new leader takes office in the United States, there will likely be a major review of what has happened, and American policy could look completely unique. In many ways, Trump’s approach represents an aberration.
The United States remains the most powerful country in the world, but it still needs allies. It cannot manage global challenges alone. Issues such as tensions with China and Taiwan, as well as the ongoing Ukraine war, require strong alliances.
The United States is therefore likely to return to a diplomatic approach closer to its traditional policies rather than continuing along Trump’s path.
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